PRESS RELEASE
Today, September 30, 1999, Ronald Branson filed a brief in the U.S. Supreme Court against Lockheed Martin Corporation, the City of Los Angeles, and the Department of Motor Vehicles.
Ronald Branson, author of the JAIL Initiative, as if a Citizen Attorney General fighting in behalf of 32 million Californians, is taking on a major multi-million dollar scam involving a parking ticket racket into which Lockheed is functioning as the City of Los Angeles Parking Violations Bureau
Branson received an accusation in the mail some five years ago that he was in violation of illegally parking a car at a time and place described, such fact being untrue. The mailer imposed an immediate penalty of $55. When Mr. Branson questioned the legitimacy of imposing such penalty without due process, he received a new demand for $119, threatening all kinds of mean and wicked things against him, including notifying the DMV that he could never register his car again.
When Branson's offer to settle the matter with the city without court action was refused, Branson brought suit. This suit has continued in court for five years. Lockheed also refused to talk settlement, and instead, choose to spend into the six-digit figure to keep their fraud afloat.
What Mr. Branson has found is that the courts have kicked into high gear to cover up for this major fraud of Lockheed corruption. The following is just the "ARGUMENT" of his brief filed with the US Supreme Court. The full brief, with appendix, is over ninety pages. What follows here is the core of his case set forth within eleven pages.
Docket No. _________________
OF THE UNITED STATES
RONALD BRANSON, Petitioner,
v.
CITY
OF LOS ANGELES;
LOS ANGELESDEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION (LADOT);
THOMAS CONNER, General Manager
LADOT;
LOCKHEED MARTIN
IMS CORPORATION (LIMSC);
EDWARD AVILA, Western
Region Senior Vice President LIMSC;
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES (DMV);
SALLY REID,
Director DMV, Respondents.
____________________
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
____________________________________________
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_____________________________________________
RONALD BRANSON
Petitioner, Pro Se
<Address omitted>
September 30, 2022
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
* * *
ARGUMENT
1. Whether the Court of Appeals willfully and maliciously violated Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requiring mandatory judicial notice.Rule 201(d) F.R.E. provides:
(d) When mandatory - A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
In the final brief of the appeal [A-48], petitioner, as plaintiff and appellant, requested the court take judicial notice of: (A) Facts from the complaint (both original and amended) [A-49 thru -53]; (B) the Relief Sought in both original and amended complaints [A-53 & -54]; and (C) the Prayer in both the original and amended complaints. [A-54 & -55]. Each item of which peti- tioner requested judicial notice is quoted verbatim, citing the precise location where that necessary informa- tion appears in the record. [A-49 thru -55].
The judgment states: "We deny Branson's requests for judicial notice�", without offering an explanation for not carrying out their mandatory duty. [A-3].
In the opening statement of the petition for rehearing [A-65], petitioner brought to the attention of the court that the judicial notice, as requested, is mandatory, citing Rule 201(d) F.R.E. The panel responsible for obeying Rule 201(d) responded by arbitrarily "vot[ing] to deny" the petition [A-8], evidencing intentional and deliberate disregard of law, which effectively is the intentional and deliberate disregard of the subject matter of this action framed by the complaint, thus maliciously closing out access to the court for redress of petitioner's grievances.
2. Whether the judgment is supported by the record.
After willfully and maliciously violating Rule 201(d), as aforesaid, the panel ruled:
We may affirm the district court's decision on any basis which the record supports. See Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir.1995). Because Branson's action is an impermissible collateral attack against a prior state court judgment, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed his section 1983 action. See id. at 291-92. [A-2].
A. The face of the judgment is entirely devoid of any showing of support from the record.
After deliberately disregarding the subject matter of this action as framed by the complaint, in ruling on this appeal, the panel, out of thin air, interprets the subject matter before the court as "an impermissible collateral attack against a prior state court judgment"[A-2] without showing a scintilla of support from the record evidencing the truth of that premise-- even though prefacing it with "We may affirm the district court's decision on any basis which the record supports." The record supporting the instant case is not "Branson v. Nott" which is an unrelated case. If anything, Branson v. Nott supports the converse, i.e., "We may not affirm the district court's decision on any basis which the record does not support." What the evidence does show is, not the exercise of judicial discretion, but a willful, malicious judicial revolt against plain law!
B. The face of the complaint shows that the judgment cannot be supported by the record.
The information of which the court refused to take the required judicial notice [A-3] establishes the subject matter of this action. Had the judges followed Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, they could have properly interpreted the subject matter of this action as supported by the record and, based thereon, found that the district court does, as a matter of law, have subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
By refusing to obey Rule 201(d), the judges deliberately disregarded the material points of fact and law set forth in the complaint (both original and amended) [A-65 thru -68] which frame the subject matter before the court.
Furthermore, prior to the judgment, petitioner placed the Court of Appeals on notice as follows [A-48]:
TO: THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT�
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that as of the time of filing of the City's Brief ("CB") to which this Reply is made, there is not so much as a single argument or mention of the controlling law of this case, namely, the denial of due process to the right of an appeal under California Code of Civil Procedure �906, nary a word throughout the CB or any of the previous appellees' briefs. THAT WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF CCP �906 AND THE PROCESS DUE THERE UNDER, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THIS CASE TO BE RESOLVED. This federal suit is based on the controlling Rule of Law.
The Court of Appeals was legally on notice that the subject matter of this case is based on section 906 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the substantive law on which this federal claim is based and clearly stated on the face of the complaint. There is no evidence on the record showing any prior state court judgment relating to the process due under CCP �906. The record indicates therefore that it is an impossibility for petitioner to have attacked a prior state court judgment, as one does not exist relevant to the subject matter of this action.
3. Whether: (a) the amended complaint [A-36] is the complaint of record before the court as a matter of law, (b) the district court should have taxed costs against petitioner, and (c) sanctions should have been imposed against petitioner.All three of the above sub-issues ride on the false premise that petitioner collaterally attacked a prior state court judgment, and false conclusion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, both shown by the record to be false herein.
Before petitioner can be held legally responsible for any monies involved (subparagraphs B and C below), the validity of the judgment [A-1 thru -4] must first be determined by this Court, or some other judicial tribunal before whom this issue may come. Determination by this Court, based on the evidence, will put the matter to rest at this time, avoiding the probability of costly, time-consuming future litigation.
A. Based on the evidence of record, amendment of the complaint is not futile.
Regarding amendment, the judgment states [A-3]:
Moreover, the district court did not err by denying Branson leave to amend his complaint because amendment would be futile given the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [Emph. added] (citation omitted)
The "district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction" is not a "given," since the appellate judges falsely interpreted the subject matter of this action by refusing to take the required judicial notice of material portions of both complaints which establish the actual subject matter hereof. (Arguments 1,2).
Accordingly, based on the evidence of record, amendment would not be futile, and the First Amended Complaint [A-36 thru -47] is the proper complaint of record before the court as a matter of law. (Rule 15(a) F.R. Civ.P.) See Schreiber Distributing v. Serv-Well Furn. Co. (9th Cir.1986) 806 F.2d 1393, 1401.
B. Costs should not have been taxed against petitioner.
Regarding taxing of costs, the judgment states [A-3]:
We further conclude that the district court did not err by taxing costs against Branson because 28 U.S.C. �1919 authorizes payment of just costs in an action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. [Emph. added] (citation omitted)
Title 28 section 1919 does not apply, since the record establishes that the district court does have jurisdiction, as aforesaid. (Argument 2).
Accordingly, based on the record, costs could not be legally taxed against petitioner, and, knowing this, any attempted exaction of monies from petitioner for costs would not only be a civil wrong, but also a criminal act of extortion.
C. Sanctions should not have been imposed against petitioner.
Regarding sanctions against petitioner, the judgment states [A-3]:
Moreover, because the record indicates that Branson's action was a frivolous and impermissible collateral attack against a prior state court judgment, the district court properly imposed sanctions sua sponte against Branson. [Emph. added] See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.
As shown in Argument 2, ante, it is impossible for petitioner to have attacked a prior state court judgment according to the evidence on record in this case.
Moreover, in referring to Rule 11 in the judgment and stating "the district court properly imposed sanctions sua sponte against Branson", the Court of Appeals has "sanctioned [the] departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by a lower court" which is yet another compelling reason for the granting of this petition "to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power." (Supreme Ct. Rule 10(a)). In imposing monetary sanctions sua sponte, the district court failed to comply with F.R.Civ.P. Rule 11 (c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B), and (c)(3) requiring the court to issue an order to show cause and provide a description of the conduct determined to violate the rule, and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. [A-11]. Neither the district court (i.e., the Chief Judge) nor the Court of Appeals has seen fit to have the court's responsibilities under Rule 11 obeyed. This failure of duty is yet another judicial disregard for clear law!
Furthermore, no evidence is shown that this action was frivolous. The court fails to show how Rule 11 applies to the circumstances here. No discussion of the facts or law of this case is made. The test for Rule 11 sanctions in the Ninth Circuit is described as follows:
The pleader, at a minimum, must have a "good faith argument" for his or her view of what the law is, or should be. A good faith belief in the merit of a legal argument is an objective condition which a competent attorney attains only after "reasonable inquiry." Such inquiry is that amount of examination into the facts and legal research which is reasonable under the circumstances of the case. [T]he conclusion drawn from the research undertaken must itself be defensible. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir.1986) 780 F.2d 823, 831.
The panel here fails to discuss any "examination into the facts and legal research" nor did it consider any of the "circumstances of the case." Quite the contrary, the judges maliciously refused to do so by denying judicial notice of information showing the "facts and legal research" and "circumstances of this case," even to the extent of violating federal rules. See Argument 1, ante.
Accordingly, the record indicates no basis for sanctions against petitioner, and, knowing this, any attempted collection of monies, or otherwise, from petitioner for sanctions would not only be a civil wrong, but a criminal act of extortion as well.
Because of the serious contingencies resting upon the judgment, it is compelling that this Court establish the validity of the judgment according to the record of this case. The Court of Appeals panel failed to do so by (1) refusing to take mandatory judicial notice of material facts and law establishing the subject matter of this action, and then (2) refusing to correct its failure by maliciously denying rehearing.
As this case stands right now, sanctions and costs against petitioner are not justified under law; a currently pending post-judgment motion for Rule 38 FRAP sanctions may shed future light on this issue. Petitioner reserves his right to file a supplemental brief, if necessary, upon receiving a decision on that motion. [Rule 15.8]
Another result of the bogus judgment of the Court of Appeals is the closing out of any possibility of the declaratory relief sought by petitioner, as well as the injunctive relief.
Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated its position: "[i]t is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14, 103 S.Ct. 2890. 2899 n.14, 44 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 160-62, 28 S.Ct. at 454-55.) Commentators observe: "[t]he best explanation of Ex parte Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws." 13B C.Wright, A.Miller, E.Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure �3566, at 102 (1984). They also observe that Shaw "leaves open the possibility that federal jurisdiction exists if an injunctive relief is sought against state officers to restrain enforcement of a state statute, but that it would not exist if only a declaratory judgment were sought." Id. 463 U.S. at 103, 103 S.Ct. at 2903. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Gates (9th Cir.1990) 916 F.2d 508, 511-12.
In the instant case, all of the rights mentioned in Guaranty were "flushed down the tubes" and don't amount to a hill of beans simply because the Ninth Circuit here, by "the stroke of a pen", decided to evade the subject matter raised by petitioner in this action, slamming the door on his rights by making a ruling they could not support by the record--and didn't care!
According to law and the facts of this case, petitioner is entitled to declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief in federal court. The violation of law by the court should not stand in the way.
Based on the evidence showing (a) that the subject matter of this action is violation of the process due in state court under California Code of Civil Procedure section 906 for which petitioner is entitled to federal relief, and (b) that there does not exist a "prior state court judgment" relevant to that process of state law, petitioner is entitled to summary judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
As stated in Carter v. Stanton (1972) 405 U.S. 669, 671, "Under Rule 56, summary judgment cannot be granted unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact�.". The judges ruling on this appeal refused to take judicial notice of the material facts. (See Argument 1, ante.) As the evidence shows, the theory of collaterally attacking a prior state court judgment is mutually exclusive from, and totally alien to, the material facts of record in both complaints. The judges had to maliciously turn their backs on the material facts of this case in order to draw a conclusion which they were unwilling and unable to support from the record.
Regarding material facts, the landmark case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) 477 U.S. 242 states at page 248 "[a]s to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material." The Ninth Circuit ruled:
Material facts are those necessary to the proof or defense of a claim, and are determined by reference to the substantive law. (See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, �). Nat. American Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Underwriters (9th Cir.1996) 93 F.3d 529, 533.
By refusing to take judicial notice of information from the complaint requested by petitioner, the panel ruling on this appeal willfully disregarded the substantive law claimed by petitioner in this action. As the record shows, that substantive law is California Code of Civil Proce- dure section 906. Any facts relating to a "collateral attack of a prior state court judgment" are not material to the substantive law of this federal claim. The record clearly shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that petitioner is entitled to summary judgment in his favor as a matter of law, that is, if law has any meaning.
* * *
CONCLUSION
The proper disposition of this case depends upon the record. Until the court provides a ruling that is supported by the record, this case stands undecided as a matter of law; and petitioner cannot be held legally or morally responsible for anything resulting from a whimsical ruling unsupported by the evidence.
Bringing this case to a lawful conclusion is a compelling reason for granting this petition, so that the court does not suffer from public exposure and the disgrace of this racket.
Dated: Sept 30, 2022
____________________________
RONALD BRANSON
Petitioner, Pro Se
<Address omitted>
This "Godzilla" Must Be Destroyed!"